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Riverside 92521
For those of you, dear members of the SAGP, who are not in a 
position to examine what I have already written on prolepsis ("Epicurean 
Semantics," in press) nor to go through the draft of the longer work 
I am writing on that subject, I have prepared an abbreviated summary 
of my views, an outline of the most important points, which once com­
mitted to memory will be an aid to your understanding my lecture in 
Philadelphia on December 29th. We require a comprehensive grasp of 
the topic, more than an examination of details·
There are precious few texts which can provide reliable information 
about Epicurean prolepsis· From what has survived of Epicurus* own 
writings there are just three examples of prolepsis, which are mentioned 
but not discussed, in connection with our knowledge of the gods, of 
justice, and of time — with the last being a case where a prolepsis 
is said not to be relevant· In book 28 of the Peri Physeos there is 
a mention of the epistemic role of prolepsis, but the context is frag­
mentary and interpretation difficult· And in the theoretical section 
opening the Letter to Herodotus scholars generally agree that prolepsis 
is being discussed, but that term is conspicuously absent from the 
discussion. Among Epicureans, Lucretius provides no discussion of 
prolepsis in the epistemic section of book 4 nor does he give us any 
examples of prolepsis, unless we translate *notitia* in that way, 
which policy cannot be adopted uniformly or without prejudicing the 
question. The helpful Diogenes of Oenoanda is not helpful here. And 
Philodemus raises more difficulties than he solves, because Philoderaus 
is an apologist for Epicureanism in the debates with the Stoics and 
is consequently prone to using Stoic vocabulary, which is especially
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evident in his Rhetorica and IDe Signis.
The Stoics1 own doctrine of prolepsis as part of their elaborate 
conceptual psychology infects the doxographical literature, as well as 
the judgment of some scholars who accept the Stoicized reports of 
Epicurean prolepseis to conclude that the two schools in this case 
made use of the same conceptual device· On the face of it that is 
most unlikely, given the differences between the two theories of psy­
chology and knowledge, the one being elegantly elaborate and the other 
spartanly simple. When one thinks of the details of Stoic theory -- 
phantasia, katalepsis, koinai ennoiai, lekta—  together with the sub­
tleties of their physics and logic — in particular their logic of 
conditionals— * one can fathom the distance between the Stoa and the 
Garden and appreciate that intellectually the Epicureans were always 
seen as country cousins. Indeed the most sophisticated reports of 
Epicurean doctrine come from Stoicized sources, from Cicero to Sextus.
What these same sources say about Epicurean prolepsis is always 
from a Stoic perspective, even when the author (Diogenes Laertius, 
Cicero) is trying to be fair. Diogenes Laertius1 report of Epicurean 
prolepsis is painfully groping, looking for the right Stoic expressions 
to describe the device: "By prolepsis they mean a kind of katalepsis 
or right opinion or concept or universal thought ( consensus omnium ) 
stored in the mind --that is, the memory of a frequent appearance from 
the outside." (D.L. X 33) Diogenes * examples should be no less sus­
pect: "As soon as man is spoken of, straightaway due to prolepsis 
his typos too is thought of ( noeitai ) with the sensory faculties 
leading the way." The expression * noeitaiT arouses my suspicions as
does the ensuing sentence: "What primarily underlies every word is
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evident and we should not have started out to seek what is sought had 
we not already recognized it·" What seems evident to me is that Diogenes 
is trying to redeem his clumsy, anachronistic account by aping two lines 
from the Letter to Herodotus and in doing so to subvert the doctrine, 
substituting ’word’ for ’utterance1 and suggesting that prolepsis in­
itiates investigations, as it does for the Stoics, where Epicurus is 
talking about settling disputes, obviating further apodeixis by pro­
viding the necessary evidence.
Cicero, in my view, is a much more careful historian of philosophy 
and indeed a good philosopher, but what he says about Epicurean prolepsis 
has difficulties of its own. I have no quarrel with his remark that 
Epicurus was the first to use the word prolepsis nor even that this 
prolepsis informs us that the gods are blessed and immortal. After all, 
Epicurus says much the same thing about the gods in his Letter to 
Menoeceus (123-124). Furthermore, Epicurus says that the truth about 
the gods is a koine noesis, and Cicero reports that accurately enough.
But unfortunately Epicurus does not tell us how such a koine noesis 
might be derived from a prolepsis. Listening to Cicero would have us 
believe that the Epicureans derive their information concerning the 
character of the gods from a universal consensus, natural intuitions 
("insitas eorura vel potius innatas cognitiones"), information which 
is stamped on the mind ("eadem insculpsit in mentibus ut eos aeternos 
et beatos habereraus" De Nat. Peor. I 43-45). And Cicero goes on to 
maintain that it is the universal nature of this consensus which makes 
it necessarily true. For my mind there is too much Stoicism in Cicero’s 
account to allow me to accept this testimony lock, stock, and bagel, 
especially when one considers that Cicero glosses over the difference
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between apprehension of the gods1 existence, using the mind as a sixth 
sense ■— what Epicurus calls epibole tes dianoias—  and recognition of 
the gods* character, which I take to be the role of prolepsis« In short, 
we can only make selective use of the testimonies of Diogenes Laertius 
and Cicero, not to mention the others· What we select to accept requires 
an independent understanding of the Epicurean doctrine·
We do not even know what role prolepsis is supposed to play in 
Epicurean theory, though sources agree that role was discussed in 
Epicurus* Canon· The criteria listed by Diogenes and Cicero are threefold, 
consisting of aisthesis, prolepsis, and pathe “ though Epicurus only 
used the word kriterion to refer to the sense faculties· But this 
threefold division is more like a troika, with each of the three going 
off in a different direction. It is not a criterion of truth, because 
the pathe are hitched up as vehicles for choice and avoidance· And 
aisthesis is represented as the criterion for knowledge, although 
Epicurus himself listed both aistheseis and pathe as having this role. 
According to Diogenes and Cicero, then. Epicurean prolepsis has neither 
a judgmental role to play, which they say is the job of aisthesis, 
nor an ethical role to play, the job of the pathe.
So, what is the role prolepsis is supposed to have in the Epicurean 
Canon? If the Epicureans were Stoics the answer would be easy enough, 
since the Stoics divided philosophy into three parts ■— adding logic to 
the parts recognized by the Epicureans: natural philosophy and ethics·
Our sources are emphatic that the Epicureans did not give logic a separate 
status. But regarding the Stoics, Diogenes Laertius reports that some 
divide logic into two parts. One is called peri kanonon kai kriterion 
and consists of the phantasiai, while the other constitutes t_o horikon,
glidden, ρ· 5
definitions which are the work of common notions. Stoic ennoiai. To a 
Stoicizing historian this might seem to be the role of prolepsis in the 
Epicurean troika, but it couldn’t be, since the testimony is adamant 
that the Epicureans denied the value of definitions. Furthermore, the 
Canon which is said to provide this troika is also said not to have 
an independent status, independent of natural philosophy.
It is a real possibility, then, that the troika listed by Diogenes 
and Cicero has been Stoicized, and that whatever trichotomy may be 
present in Epicurus’ Canon concerned a threefold division of perceptual 
evidence, consisting of the evidence of the sense faculties ( aistheseis ), 
the evidence of the experience of pleasure and pain ( the pathe ), 
and something else. Diogenes even suggests what this something else 
might be and Epicurus confirms it: the sixth sense, epibole tes dianoias, 
where the mind itself is sensitive to especially fine atomic images 
which penetrate it and trigger recognitions. At this point. Epicurean 
prolepsis as a separate criterion, in the Stoic sense, seems to dis­
appear from Epicurus’ Canon.
With astonishing unanimity, scholars put prolepsis back into the 
Canon and into a pivotal role by reading it into Herodotus 37-38, where 
Epicurus prefaces his arguments on natural philosophy with a discussion 
of his theory of evidence. The word prolepsis is missing from the dis­
cussion, but this might possibly be an inconspicuous omission, if one 
agrees with Sedley’s suggestion that Epicirus had not yet invented the 
word, since the only mention of the term in the Letter to Herodotus at 
#72 could easily be a later addition. And in the passage in question the 
term proton ennoema seems to be a convenient standin. What is most
compelling about this interpretation is that Cicero, Sextus, and Diogenes
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Laertius, among others, all make a claim about Epicurean prolepsis which 
is echoed in this passage: namely, that having a prolepsis is necessary 
for conducting any empirical investigation or answering any problem of 
natural philosophy:
First of all, Herodotus, it is necessary to grasp what underlies 
our utterances [ ta hypotetagmena tois phthongois...dei eilephenai ], 
so that by referring to them we may have a means of judging 
our opinions, inquiries, and problems, and not give endless 
demonstrations which leave everything undetermined or use empty 
utterances® For the primary thought for every utterance must be 
seen [ anagke gar to proton ennoema kath* hekaston phthongon 
blepesthai ] and there be no need of further proof [ apodeixeos ], 
if we are to have a point of reference for inquiries, problems, 
and opinions. Wherefore it is necessary to keep a close watch 
over our perceptions [ aistheseis ], that is to say over our 
current apprehendings (whether they be mental or any of the sense 
organs) [ tas parousas epibolas eite dianoias eithT hotou depote 
ton kriterion ], as well as over our present feelings [ ta 
hyparchonta pathe ], so that we may be able to infer what awaits 
confirmation and what is not evident. (Her. 37-38, von der Muehll) 
Without arguing in detail, let me simply point out that if what turns 
out to be prolepsis is being discussed here, prolepseis are not 
exclusively what underlies our utterances. The primary bit of information, 
or Frotofl ennoema, for every utterance must encompass more than prolepsis 
in any case.
What underlies our utterances is to settle questions of natural
philosophy, rather than initiate them. The first part of this passage
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does not present an Epicurean answer to the paradox of inquiry, but rather 
an answer to the question of what settles investigations: namely, the 
point of reference which our utterances are about. And the second half 
of the passage tells us how to find that point of reference by lisitng 
the trichotomy which Epicurus mentions elsewhere: the five sense faculties, 
the sixth sense, and the feelings of pleasure and pain. It is the empirical 
evidence derived in this way which will put an end to demonstrations, 
which will decide questions, which will give reference to our utterances, 
and most importantly will itself not need demonstration, because, as 
Epicurus was notorious for saying, perceptual evidence is always true.
Now we do not even need to read prolepsis into this passage to make 
good sense of it. And in any case, the Stoic role for prolepsis, which 
is analogous to that of the ennoiai, the initial concepts which provide 
a starting point for inquiry along the line of their definitions, defining 
what it is one is looking for, this Stoic use of prolepsis is not what 
Epicurus is talking about in this passage. Defined concepts won’t answer 
empirical questions. Consequently, if prolepseis are included in our 
passage, then their role is clearly an evidential one, providing some 
reference point about the nature of things, in the way that aisthesis 
does. Like aisthesis, then, prolepseis must make claims about the world, 
not just provide concepts with which to make those claims, something 
the Stoics were quite concerned about, the Epicureans not.
Epicurus’ own examples support the point that prolepseis are 
evidential claims. As we have seen, one such prolepsis is that the 
gods are blessed and immortal. When Epicurus makes this claim in Menoeceus 
123-124, he contrast prolepseis with false judgments about the character 
of the gods. And when he mentions the prolepsis of justice, the author
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of the Kyriai Doxai — presumably Epicurus—  presents the claim that justice 
is what serves the needs of social intercourse. Apparently, prolepseis 
take the form of claims about the way things are. These claims are facts 
about the world, not mere opinions. So prolepsis enjoys the evidential 
status aisthesis does.
Consequently I see no foundation for the most common interpretation, 
that Epicurean prolepsis is some kind of conceptual device. The most 
popular version of this thesis has been that prolepseis are the meanings 
of individual words, as they might also have been for the Stoics, in­
dividual concepts which when strung together in the appropriate way 
would provide meaning to sentences, constituting lekta· Now I have argued 
against this interpretation in "Epicurean Semantics,” where I pointed 
out that we should take the evidence of Plutarch and Sextus seriously, 
that there is nothing in Epicureanism comparable to what the Stoics 
claimed was the significance ( t_o semainomenon ) of voiced sounds. The 
Epicureans made do with just voiced sounds, or utterances, and the events 
happening in the world which those utterances referred to. Attention to 
everything which the Epicureans say about the origin and character of 
language suggests that utterances label states of the world, or else 
they are vacuous sounds. The prolepseis, then, are not vehicles of 
meaning, but conveyances of evidence making claims on the world, not 
making sense of our vocabulary.
Some would maintain that nevertheless prolepseis are mental re­
presentations, though what they represent are complex ideas about the 
world. This too seems unlikely. The authority of perception and the 
authority of our feelings would be called into question, with disastrous
consequences for Epicurean empiricism, were it the case that what it is
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we see or how it is we feel were somehow dependent upon our own sub­
jective perspective and viewpoint· The Epicureans were adamant on the 
mechanical, automatic character of perception and feeling, which somehow 
guaranteed the information we received from our senses was information 
about the state of the world, as opposed to our state of mind· The purely 
referential character of what it is we perceive and the pleasure and pain 
we feel is what guarantees the epistemic authority of aisthesis and pathe· 
Now it appears not just from secondary sources but also from what 
Epicurus states in book 28 of his Peri Physeos that prolepsis also 
enjoys such evidential authority. This would require that the claims 
of prolepsis have the same referential fixity as that enjoyed by aisthesis 
and the pathe. Indeed, it is only if this is so that prolepseis could 
possibly be construed as at least part of what underlies our utterances, 
as part of the proton ennoema behind every utterance, which is the point 
of reference for all investigation.
We conclude that prolepsis for the Epicureans makes evidential claims 
on the nature of reality. But we still need to know how such prolepseis 
are generated and what sorts of events in the world they describe. To answer 
either question is to offer conjecture. One of the controversies in the 
literature concerns whether Epicurean prolepsis is restricted to abstract 
entities, as the example of justice would seem to suggest, or to individual 
things, as Diogenes’ examples suggest and the example of the character 
of the gods speaks in favor of. What complicates conjecture is the very 
real possibility that over time the Epicureans may have changed their 
mind on the range of prolepseis. Both Diogenes and Cicero talk of 
revisions of the younger Epicureans in this context, and Plutarch and
Sextus make similar suggestions. It could be the case that at first
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prolepsis played a rather minor role with a restricted range and over time 
the range extended·
From the examples we do have in Epicurus it seems that prolepsis is 
concerned with the character of a thing or a state of affairs — what it 
is to be just, as opposed to what the instantiations of justice are, 
what the character of the gods is, as opposed to who the gods are. Given 
Epicurean epistemic realism, these claims on the character of some thing 
or state must be seen as claims on the world, so that prolepsis, like 
aisthesis for a realist, is ambiguous between the psychological act of 
apprehension and the content discerned, some feature of the world. In the 
case of prolepsis what is discerned should be some abiding character 
in things, as opposed to some temporary appearance. Not surprisingly. 
Epicurean atomism suggests the need for these two different kinds of 
information. Since all that exists are simply atoms moving in the void, 
on any occasion what one perceives is, as it were, a time slice of a
continuous process ----so the apple looks green now. It is also the case
that certain atomic configurations are relatively abiding in any par­
ticular cosmos. And so in our world water has a particular atomic 
arrangement and iron another. Information about the one, the state of 
current appearances, is not the same as information about the other, 
the relatively abiding state of nature.
The history of PlatoTs Forms and Aristotle*s natural kinds should 
have made Epicurus more sensitive to this issue than Democritus would 
have been, and in any case this sensitivity to the abiding structures 
in nature is certainly obvious from the De Rerum Natura. There is clearly 
a need for information about these abiding structures in natural philosophy
and this need can be satisfied in part by Epicurean inference and confirmation
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But it also appears that we can recognize the abiding character in 
perceived things and states· We recognize justice to be what serves 
social interest, the gods to be blessed and immortal· Such recognitions 
are part of the evidence, not part of our inferences· And prolepsis, 
it seems, constitutes such recognitions·
The question how prolepsis differs from aisthesis becomes, on my 
view, mostly a matter of degree. On a strict view of perception we 
perceive only sights and sounds, smells and tastes: colors, shapes, 
specific noises and other such primitive phenomena. To perceive 
a man or a tower in the distance would then require a more elaborate 
psychological process. At what point this more elaborate process becomes 
something other than perception is difficult to say. Broadly speaking, 
recognizing a tower in the distance remains aisthesis, not being an 
inference. But it could well be that at some point Epicurus or Epicureans 
wanted to discriminate some more sophisticated recognitions as the work 
of prolepsis, possibly recognitions requiring repeated experiences so 
as to make familiar lingering characteristics or forms. A passage in 
Philoderaus1 De. Signis claims there is a prolepsis for human nature, 
just as Diogenes Laertius suggested that there is a persistent form 
recognized throughout the instances of accumulated experience of seeing 
a man or seeing a horse. Yet judging from Epicurus’ own examples, perception 
seems to take on the responsibility for recognizing natural structures, 
leaving prolepsis for the more abstract characteristics requiring more 
than the operation of the sense organs but the mind as well, the case 
of justice, the case of the gods1 character.
If we could determine how prolepseis arise, we might be in a 
position to determine their range. As I understand prolepsis, it cannot
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be the work of any particular sense organ, but it is a perceptual recognition 
of the mind as a result of the work of the separate sense organs· But if 
we assume it is the work of dianoia, it is still something we perceive 
in the world, not a rational reconstruction or hypothesis· Here the case 
of the gods is instructive. The mind, operating as a sixth sense sensitive 
to especially fine eidola, perceives the gods, just as it perceives 
phantoms in dreams. I suggest that this same apprehension of the mind, 
epibole tes dianoias, can perceive persistent characteristics characterizing 
the things it or the other sense faculties perceive, the sorts of things 
these things are. And so we have a prolepsis that the gods are blessed and 
immortal, over and above having a vision of them. Presumably these 
prolepseis are formed in the mind as a result of repeated experiences, 
allowing us to get acquainted with the persistent characters of things.
As accumulated information, these prolepseis would be common to all 
familiar with the same sorts of experiences.
My best guess is that in Epicurean theory prolepsis was first 
understood as a type of epibole tes dianoias, and the two remained 
associated with each other as perceptual activities of dianoia, sometimes 
taking in mental visions, sometimes recognizing natural kinds and 
characters. In the case of the gods it would have been easy to confuse 
the two activities as Cicero did. And it is easy to understand how the 
recognition of natural types could come to be identified with primitive 
concepts, which the Stoics wanted.
I hope, dear members of the SAGP, that this synopsis of ray views 
will help show you the way to ataraxia, if not Philadelphia.
